Can the UK government be 'world-leading' in both trade and climate policy? by Lydgate, Emily & Anthony, Chloe
KEY POINTS 
• To become a world leader in trade and climate policy the UK needs to develop an integrated strategy that 
enhances areas of mutual supportiveness and addresses areas of potential conflict. 
Enhancing mutual supportiveness:
• UK climate legislation does not currently include trade-related emissions. Factoring in aviation and shipping 
would help to address this problem. 
• The UK’s approach to integrating climate into its new free trade agreements (FTAs), as well as its 
‘continuity agreements’ with former EU FTA trade partners, is inconsistent. Notably, continuity agreements 
are a lost opportunity to update existing trade agreements in order to reflect the net-zero emissions by 
2050 target.
• Subsidies for fossil fuels should be transparent and reduced, and exceptions to carbon taxes narrowed or 
removed to provide coherence with both WTO rules and the net-zero target. 
• The UK has unilaterally reduced tariffs on a number of environmental goods but has maintained relatively 
high EU tariffs on bicycles and hybrid electric vehicles, which could be further reduced.
Addressing areas of potential conflict:
• A green recovery from COVID-19 provides an impetus to introduce broader and higher carbon taxes, 
but these could have a negative impact on UK firms and push the UK towards imposing commensurate 
carbon taxes on imported products. To avoid this potential area of conflict with WTO obligations and/
or relationships, the UK needs to raise ambition for carbon pricing in the WTO arena and in its FTA 
negotiations.
• Barring an increase in global ambition to accelerate climate-friendly manufacturing, probably more trade 
restrictions will be needed to achieve a net-zero target. The UK will need to move towards or maintain trade 
preferences that support the target.
• Current UK green subsidies are likely to be WTO-compliant but fall short of the ambition needed to achieve 
the net-zero target, but upping ambition also increases the risk of WTO non-compliance. This underscores 
the need to replace disciplines provided under the EU State Aid framework.
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emissions. Aviation, shipping and international 
production and consumption emissions are not 
measured in its carbon budgeting. This is in line with 
the approach of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, 
but some countries – including Scotland – incorporate 
aviation and shipping in their targets and the UK’s 
independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has 
long recommended that England follow its lead. 
Aside from addressing aviation and shipping 
emissions, the domestic focus of UK legislation has 
translated into limited CCC scrutiny of the trade policy 
measures required to meet the net-zero target. But 
the domestic areas in which the CCC calls for the 
most urgent action to meet a net-zero target clearly 
implicate trade policy. These include the phase-out 
of petrol and diesel vehicles, the incentivisation 
and installation of low-carbon heating, and the 
decarbonisation of industry.1 Implementing these 
measures will require subsidies, which are subject 
to WTO notification and challenge, and will need to 
address competitiveness concerns resulting from 
measures which aim to restrict higher-emissions 
imports, such as banning the import of certain 
products, imposing UK energy efficiency requirements 
on imported products, or even taxing imported 
products. This demonstrates how meeting even a 
purely domestic emissions reduction target will likely 
require new controls on trade.
To meet its net-zero target, the UK needs to 
encourage trade and investment in low-carbon 
goods, services and technologies, and discourage 
trade and investment in high-carbon goods, services 
and technologies. This target should inform its 
approach to tariffs and trade preferences, including 
multilateral tariffs and FTAs. Coordinating climate 
and trade objectives in these areas will not happen 
automatically. In the absence of legislation, setting 
out a clear, cross-cutting policy is all the more 
important.
b) UK free trade agreements diverge in approach 
and ambition
A particularly important area for policy coherence is 
UK FTAs.2 The UK is currently re-negotiating the FTAs 
which it was party to as an EU Member State as 
well as pursuing new FTA negotiations with Australia, 
New Zealand, the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
Parties and the United States. 
1 CCC, Net Zero: The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming 
(May 2019), pp11-13.
2 See also Aldersgate Group, Aligning the UK’s trade policy with its 
climate and environmental goals (June 2020). Available at: https://
www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/asset/1671.
INTRODUCTION
The UK Government has clearly indicated its ambition 
for global leadership in two policy areas – liberal, 
open trade and climate change mitigation – but 
are these goals compatible? Whilst the WTO and 
trade agreements aim to facilitate free movement 
of goods and services and restrict trade-distorting 
subsidies, climate policy requires governments to pick 
‘winners’ – e.g. renewables over petroleum-based 
energy – and restrict high-carbon goods. The UK has 
been a champion of market-based approaches to 
environmental regulation, but its current trajectory 
is not sufficiently ambitious to achieve its net-zero 
emissions by 2050 target, suggesting that more 
intervention will be required. In some areas, such 
intervention sits uncomfortably with the UK’s drive 
to negotiate or re-negotiate over 40 free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and champion open multilateral 
trade. In others, the UK can use trade policy to 
facilitate trade and production of low-carbon goods 
and services. 
In this Briefing Paper, we examine the coherence 
of UK trade and climate goals in response to three 
questions:
1. Has the UK Government set out a clear strategy 
for integrating trade and climate policy?
2. Is the UK Government acting on areas of mutual 
supportiveness?
3. Is the UK Government addressing areas of 
potential conflict?
We find room for improvement in relation to all 
three questions. In answer to the first question, 
we identify a lack of cross-cutting strategy in UK 
climate legislation and in its approach to free trade 
agreements. On the second question, we suggest the 
UK reforms its approach to fossil fuel subsidies and 
builds on its efforts in regard to environmental goods. 
And on the third question, we underscore the lack of 
ambition of current UK climate mitigation measures 
and lack of transparency around future measures, and 
discuss the need for an ambitious UK approach to 
carbon pricing. 
SETTING OUT A CLEAR STRATEGY
a) Core legislation does not integrate trade-
related emissions into the climate target
One factor that hampers efforts to integrate trade 
and climate strategy is that the domestic legislation 
in which the net-zero target is enshrined, the UK 
Climate Change Act, does not include trade-related 
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updated, it is a lost opportunity to integrate the net-
zero target into UK FTAs, which cover a substantial 
portion of UK trade. Indeed, even relatively recent 
EU FTAs are arguably outdated, evidenced by the fact 
that the EU is reforming its approach to better reflect 
its own net-zero target.4 There are also unanswered 
questions about how the UK intends to operationalise 
these environmental commitments, which require new 
institutional arrangements. This is an area to watch.
With respect to future FTAs, the UK also lacks 
a cross-cutting strategy on climate. There is no 
post-Brexit legislation specifically pertaining to 
the negotiation of new UK FTAs, but the most 
recent strategy document from the Department 
for International Trade, ‘Processes for making free 
trade agreements after the United Kingdom has left 
the European Union,’ makes no mention of climate 
change.5 
4 European Commission, ‘The European Green Deal’, COM(2019) 
640, pp 20-21. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf.
5 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/782176/command-paper-scrutiny-transparency-27012019.pdf.
At the time of writing, the draft Trade Bill is being 
debated in Parliament. It establishes the process 
by which EU FTAs are re-negotiated, referred to as 
‘trade continuity’, and also provides a legislative 
footing for UK trade remedies and membership of 
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement. The 
Bill makes no reference to incorporating or reflecting 
environmental or climate change commitments. As 
the following analysis of the treaty texts shows, this 
is borne out in continuity agreements themselves.3 
Their emphasis has been on expediency, to ensure 
that companies will not face new trade barriers after 
the end of the transition period. As such they have 
copy-pasted EU language on trade and environment 
that is in some cases years out of step with the EU’s 
current approach of including dedicated Trade and 
Environment chapters. Agreements with no or badly 
outdated environment and climate provisions are 
shaded in grey in the table above.
The problem of inheritance has clearly hampered UK 
innovation in this area. If these provisions are not 
3 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-trade-agreements-
with-non-eu-countries.
Trade Partner Environment Climate Change
Chile Yes – From 2002 EU Agreement No
Andean Countries Yes - Approach incorporated from 2013 EU Agreement Yes
Central America Yes - Approach incorporated from 2012 EU Agreement Yes
Eastern and Southern Africa Yes – From 2007 EU Agreement No
Georgia Yes – From 2016 EU Agreement Yes
Iceland/Norway No No
Israel Yes – From 2000 EU Agreement No
Jordan Yes – From 2002 EU Agreement No
Lebanon Yes – From 2002 EU Agreement No
South Korea Yes – From 2011 EU Agreement Yes
Switzerland Yes; includes the possibility to update environmental provisions (Article 8) No
TABLE 1:  EXISTING CONTINUITY AGREEMENTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE 
CHAPTERS
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Recommendations for setting out a clear strategy:
• Legislate to include shipping and aviation in 
England’s net-zero climate targets. 
• Develop a clear, cross-cutting policy strategy to 
integrate net-zero targets into UK trade policy.
• Produce a cross-cutting strategy ensuring UK FTAs, 
including continuity agreements, contain reference 
to upholding the UK’s net-zero target. 
• Introduce a ‘red line’ of compliance with the Paris 
Agreement at the very minimum to ensure new 
FTAs do not undermine the UK’s domestic target.
ACTING ON AREAS OF ‘MUTUAL 
SUPPORTIVENESS’
a) Fossil fuel subsidies are non-transparent 
The G20, G7 and the European Commission have all 
pledged to phase out fossil fuels subsidies. Such 
action would be a win-win for trade liberalisation 
and reaching net-zero targets but countries have 
made limited progress on achieving this goal: one 
tracker found the UK was top in pledges, but bottom 
in transparency among the G7 countries.10 The UK 
claims that it does not provide any subsidies for 
fossil fuels11, but other analyses by the European 
Commission and the OECD suggest it does.12 This is 
due to different approaches to calculating subsidies. 
The Commission’s report, for example, found the UK 
to be the largest provider of support for fossil fuels 
in the EU at €11.6 billion per year (in contrast to 
€7.76 billion for renewables), highlighting tax reliefs 
for energy-intensive industry and UK households.13
10 S. Whitley et al, G7 fossil fuel subsidy scorecard: Tracking the 
phase-out of fiscal support and public finance for oil, gas and coal 
(ODI 2018), p3.
11 The 2019 climate policy plan states that the issue of phasing 
out energy subsidies is ‘not applicable’ to the UK. BEIS, The UK’s 
draft integrated national energy and climate plan (NECP) (2019), 
pp32-34. In response to a FOI request, DECC stated that the UK 
has ‘no fossil fuel subsidies’ on the basis of its definition of fossil 
fuel subsidies as ‘government action that lowers the pre-tax price 
to consumers to below international market levels.’ DECC, FOI 
2015/15308. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/455512/FOI_2015_15038_PUB.pdf.
12 Trinomics, Study on energy prices, costs and subsidies and their 
impact on industry and households (Trinomics 2018). Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/energy_
prices_and_costs_-final_report-v12.3.pdf. OECD, Fossil fuel support 
country note: United Kingdom (April 2019). OECD inventory of fossil 
fuel subsidies GBR (figures to 2017). Available at https://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FFS_GBR.
13 Trinomics, ibid, p268.
The UK Government has released strategy documents 
for its negotiations with the EU, the US, New Zealand, 
Australia and the CPTPP. Except for the CPTPP and 
EU strategies, all explicitly reference the UK’s net-
zero target. The EU strategy references the Paris 
Agreement rather than the net-zero target and states 
that climate change will be dealt with in a standalone 
Energy Agreement which has not yet been produced.6 
This seems excessively narrow given that climate 
commitments have environmental and trade impacts 
and both Parties share a net-zero target. Aside from 
this, FTA strategies seem to be calibrated to the 
partner’s commitment to climate change mitigation. 
For example, the New Zealand strategy calls for the 
FTA to support both countries’ net-zero commitments 
and set ‘a high standard for clean growth in 
future trade agreements’.7 The Australian strategy 
contains a more circumscribed commitment to ‘seek 
sustainability provisions, including on environment 
and climate change, that meet the ambition of both 
parties on these issues’.8 The US strategy simply 
states that the UK will aim to use FTAs to support 
its delivery of climate commitments.9 Whilst some 
calibration is a realistic approach for the UK to take 
in order to successfully conclude these FTAs, the 
UK must ensure that these FTAs at the very least do 
not undermine its target, and some of the objectives 
outlined very much lack in ambition. 
FTAs have the potential to remove trade barriers 
on energy-efficient goods and services, align 
commitments to green subsidies and reduce fossil 
fuel subsidies, as well as coordinate carbon pricing 
mechanisms, all reinforcing action towards net-zero 
targets. There has been some recent progress in 
tying in climate ambition with FTAs. EU FTAs with 
Singapore, Japan and Canada have included such 
provisions, although they are generally non-binding 
elements. The EU’s negotiating objectives for the 
UK include provisions on equivalence in carbon 
pricing. But countries may also use FTAs to secure 
favourable terms for their high-carbon exports. The 
US has refused any mention of climate change in any 
future agreement with the UK. The UK could aim for 
climate-friendly FTAs by including ‘climate red lines’ in 
its negotiations, but when potential partners are not 
willing to integrate trade and climate policy, this will 
be an area of hard choices for the UK Government.
6 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/868874/The_Future_Relationship_with_the_EU.pdf, p23.
7 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/901870/uk-strategy-uk-nz-free-trade-agreement.pdf, p7.
8 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/901886/uk-strategy-australia-free-trade-agreement.pdf, p12.
9 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/869592/UK_US_FTA_negotiations.pdf, p23.
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Rather than a policy of reducing support for fossil 
fuels, the UK currently has a strategy of ‘maximum 
economic recovery’ for domestic oil and gas 
production, including the development of shale gas.14 
This stands in contrast to the position set out in 
the European Commission’s climate strategy, for 
example, which defines energy security in terms of ‘a 
decreased reliance on gas and oil imports.’15
WTO subsidy rules do not treat renewable energy or 
fossil fuel subsidies differently, but only renewables 
subsidies have provoked WTO disputes. This is likely 
to be due to the fact that fossil fuel subsidies often 
benefit consumers rather than producers, and the 
glass house effect. But reducing fossil fuel subsidies 
would improve compliance with WTO rules and is 
coherent with climate policy.
b) A positive step for policy coherence: 
liberalisation of environmental goods
A bright spot in the coherence of UK trade and 
environment policy is the UK’s unilateral decision 
to liberalise more tariffs on environmental goods. 
Liberalisation of environmental goods and services, 
including those supportive of climate change 
mitigation, has long been recognised as mutually 
supportive for trade and the environment. It is 
included as a negotiating item in the current 
Doha Round at the WTO, which has evolved into a 
plurilateral negotiation toward an Environmental 
Goods Agreement including major emitters and 
exporters China, the US and the EU. Whilst 
negotiations have stalled, a helpful analysis from 
IISD16 reveals that the UK Government has provided a 
fairly generous unilateral offer. It maintains tariff-free 
access provided under the EU and offers additional 
tariff reduction or elimination on almost 200 identified 
environmental goods. However, the UK has maintained 
the relatively high EU tariff of 14% on bicycles and 
10% on hybrid-electric passenger vehicles. This has 
the potential to undermine its subsidy support for 
Ultra-Low Emissions Vehicles and transport-related 
climate change targets.
Recommendations for acting on areas of mutual 
supportiveness:
• The UK should reform its approach to fossil fuel 
subsidies by improving transparency in line with 
both WTO rules and the UNFCCC framework.
14 OGA, The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK 
(BEIS 2016).
15 European Commission, A Clean Planet for All: A European 
strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and 
climate neutral economy (COM(2018) 773 final), p8.
16 D Grozoubinski, G Riddell, R Steenblik, ‘The U.K.’s Global Tariff: 
Will a new broom sweep green?’ (IISD 11.05.20). Available at: 
https://www.iisd.org/blog/uk-global-tariff-new-broom.
• The UK can build on unilateral progress in the 
liberalisation of environmental goods and services 
by continuing to engage with the plurilateral 
Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations 
and further liberalise bicycles and hybrid-electric 
passenger vehicles.
ADDRESSING AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
CONFLICT
a) Climate change mitigation subsidies in the 
global context
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented 
reduction in global carbon emissions coupled as 
it has been with a fall in economic output. But 
reaching the targets set out in international and UK 
climate law needs sustained and substantial cuts 
in emissions year after year that are not associated 
with health and welfare crises. 
Because the Paris Agreement does not determine 
which policy tools are acceptable for achieving 
the climate target, the WTO has become a primary 
international forum regulating climate measures, 
and renewable energy subsidies have resulted in 
a number of disputes. Under WTO rules governing 
subsidies, countries can retaliate directly against 
some subsidies by applying tariffs or challenging 
them directly through disputes. Such ‘actionable’ 
subsidies must be aimed at specific industries, 
sectors or regions, and provide a financial 
contribution that confers a benefit, which effectively 
means better-than-market conditions (Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Articles 1 
and 2). The concept of ‘financial contribution’ casts 
a broad net, covering not only grants and loans but 
also tax exemptions and R&D. These categories 
together encompass many policy instruments used 
to promote renewable energy both in the UK and 
globally. Compounding this problem is that the SCM 
Agreement does not permit countries to argue that 
subsidies are WTO-compatible on the basis that 
they pursue environmental goals. Though many have 
argued for reform,17 there is currently no indication 
that WTO Members will negotiate exceptions for 
subsidies facilitating trade in low-carbon goods and 
services.
A factor that complicates, but not necessarily 
decreases, the potential for WTO action against UK 
green subsidies is an increasingly low level of global 
17 Eg, S. Shadikhodjaev ‘Renewable Energy and Government 
Support: Time to ‘Green’ the SCM Agreement?’ (2015) 14(3) World 
Trade Review 479; L. Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies 
for Renewable Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law 
Reform,’ (2015) 15(2) J Int Econ Law 525.
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adherence to WTO rules in this area,18 and the fact 
that the WTO’s Appellate Body is currently unable 
to function due to the US blocking the appointment 
of new judges. Despite the fact that they may well 
be living in glass houses whilst throwing stones, 
countries will likely not hesitate to apply retaliatory 
tariffs to compensate for alleged harm from UK 
green subsidies, emboldened by the lack of a 
strong referee. However, it is unlikely that existing 
UK subsidies will prompt much retaliation; they are 
structured to maximise the role of the private sector 
in providing incentives, thus reducing the scope for 
complaint.
b) Current UK climate change mitigation 
subsidies are not ambitious or transparent 
enough
UK Government policy is currently set out in two 
outdated documents that do not account for the 
amended net-zero target or Covid-19: the 2017 Clean 
Growth Strategy and the 2019 UK Draft Integrated 
National Energy and Climate Plan. The need for 
increased ambition is self-evident. This is borne out 
by the CCC, which concluded that the UK is not even 
on track for its previous 80% emissions reduction 
target.19 This means that the UK will need to increase 
its ambition; to do so without creating problems 
for itself in the WTO, it would be useful to maintain 
internal disciplines and transparency in its subsidies 
framework as it leaves the EU. To illustrate, we briefly 
examine (i) price supports for renewable energy, which 
bring down costs and create consumer incentives for 
renewables; and (ii) green innovation investment. 
(i) Price supports for renewable energy
The UK has been a leader in the deregulation of 
energy markets and the promotion of ‘subsidy-free’ 
renewables. An example of this approach is the Smart 
Export Guarantee, which involves energy companies 
setting prices paid for small-scale renewables 
generation rather than the UK Government. Another 
example is Contracts for Difference for low-carbon 
electricity production, which are priced by competitive 
auction. A further key price support subsidy, the 
Renewable Heat Incentive, has simply not been taken 
up to the extent the Government expected. Here, it 
is not compliance with WTO rules that is the main 
concern - the Appellate Body has suggested that 
competitive bidding makes infringement of subsidy 
18 S. Evenett and J. Fritz, ‘Jar Jar not War War: Prioritising WTO 
reform options’ (Vox 13.06.19). Available at: https://voxeu.org/
article/jaw-jaw-not-war-war-prioritising-wto-reform-options.
19 CCC, Reducing UK emissions – 2020 Progress Report to 
Parliament (June 2020).
rules unlikely20 - but lack of ambition. With the UK’s 
proportion of renewable energy one of the lowest in 
Europe,21 the CCC and others have pointed to frequent 
changes and slow policy development as inhibiting 
the sector, suggesting the need for a stronger and 
more durable subsidies framework.22
(ii) Green innovation investment 
A notable element of the Clean Growth Strategy 
is its commitment to £2.5 billion of investment 
to low carbon innovation. Government grants and 
investments targeted to specific companies to 
support development of clean energy technology is 
clearly aimed at an industry or group of industries and 
provides a benefit. Existing UK schemes, such as the 
Energy Entrepreneurs Fund, integrate EU State Aid 
rules: a transparent and competitive bidding process 
sets out cost criteria and manages investment 
thresholds. Such safeguards make it more likely that 
grant schemes will not trigger WTO complaints. 
The UK Government has provided little information 
about its approach to subsidies post-Brexit, and there 
is some suggestion that this will be a lightly-regulated 
area.23 This, coupled with an increase in subsidies 
to meet the net-zero target, could increase the risk 
of challenges in the WTO. The UK Government’s 
hasty action to rescue failing airline FlyBe in January 
2020 by waiving its air passenger duty payments is 
concerning. It showed a willingness to undermine the 
net-zero target, which will require increasing taxes 
on airlines, and prompted competitor International 
Airline Group to lodge a complaint with the European 
Commission for violation of EU State Aid rules.24 It is 
unclear whether or how the UK will replicate State Aid 
controls in future investment, but to avoid complaints 
and retaliation it is important that it does so.
20 Appellate Body Report, Canada- Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Sector (‘Canada-Renewable Energy’) and Canada- 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada – Feed-in 
Tariff Program), WT/DS412/19 and WT/DS426/19, adopted 24 May 
2013, para. 5.228.
21 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/graph.do?tab=
graph&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_31&toolbox=type.
22 CCC, An independent assessment of the UK’s Clean Growth 
Strategy: from ambition to action (January 2018). J. Timperley, 
‘Six charts show mixed progress for UK renewables’ (Carbon Brief 
20.07.18). Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/six-charts-
show-mixed-progress-for-uk-renewables.
23 P. Foster and J. Pickard, ‘Cummings leads push for light-touch 
UK state-aid regime after Brexit’, July 27, 2020, Financial Times. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e29430c7-9dae-440e-
8093-74f705ce62c3.
24 M. Acton, ‘IAG’s Flybe complaint sets stage for Brexit bust-up 
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c) UK carbon pricing is still not high or consistent 
enough to meet the net-zero target
UK carbon pricing operates both by participation 
in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) and a 
domestic carbon tax, the Carbon Price Floor. Carbon 
pricing schemes differ greatly around the world and 
may result in industries in countries with high carbon 
taxes facing pressure from imports from countries 
with lower tax burdens. The future shape of UK 
carbon pricing is not yet confirmed25 but the balance 
between an effective carbon tax and its impact on 
competitiveness for high-emitting industries is not 
easy to achieve.
This has led the UK, in line with the EU’s approach, 
to offer state aid and free emissions allowances 
for energy-intensive industries. Although never 
challenged at the WTO, this should be interpreted as 
an actionable subsidy. Raising or broadening carbon 
taxes is, however, necessary. Recent analysis has 
shown that a carbon price of £40/tCO2 would be 
required for the UK to reach its net-zero target26, which 
is significantly higher than the EU ETS and the UK 
Carbon Price Floor. Covid-19 provides an ‘opportunity’ 
to do this whilst demand for conventional fuel is low 
and would prevent an emissions rebound, contributing 
to a green recovery; but it risks increasing the 
asymmetry between the UK and other countries. 
One solution to the carbon pricing problem is border 
carbon adjustment (BCA): import fees for countries 
25 The latest proposal was announced in June 2020. Available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-emissions-trading-
system-proposal-would-see-uk-go-further-in-tackling-climate-change.
26 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment, How to price carbon to reach net-zero emissions in the 
UK (May 2019).
with low or no carbon pricing mechanism. BCA has 
long been discussed in the EU and is now included as 
an option in its Green Deal if ‘differences in levels of 
ambition persist.’ The EU has not set out how BCAs 
might be implemented and compliance with WTO 
rules rests on how they are designed in order to avoid 
running contrary to the National Treatment and Most 
Favoured Nation principles. But WTO compliance risks 
lowering its effectiveness in incentivising a reduction 
in emissions both domestically and internationally. 
Here, WTO compliance may indeed conflict with 
UK climate policy. This friction would be removed, 
however, if there was international agreement on a 
global or regional carbon pricing mechanism.
Recommendations for addressing areas of potential 
conflict:
• The UK must reassess what subsidies are required 
for its new net-zero target and increase its current 
level of ambition. 
• To avoid attracting WTO complaints and retaliatory 
tariffs, the UK must introduce internal controls on 
subsidies and transparency in its approach.
• To meet its climate target, the UK will need to 
adopt a more ambitious approach to carbon 
pricing. Coordination with the EU on carbon pricing 
will be useful to mitigate negative impacts for UK 
exporters.
CONCLUSION
Assessing UK policies that fall at the intersection of trade and climate is complicated by a number of unknowns. 
These include the UK’s future approach to subsidies, which remains largely undefined, and the extent to which 
the UK remains aligned with EU climate policy across a range of areas after the transition period. With respect 
to the likelihood of trade conflict, there are global systemic factors over which the UK has little control. These 
include the weakening of transparency and dispute settlement mechanisms in the WTO, which reduces the 
efficacy of the WTO as an international referee whilst increasing the likelihood of trade retaliation, as well as 
the extent to which countries move to respond to the urgency of climate change. Strong global ambition to 
reduce emissions lessens the political and economic motive for trade disputes in relation to UK climate policy.
Despite these uncertainties, this survey suggests that more coordination will be required to integrate the net-
zero target into UK trade policy. In some areas, like fossil fuel subsidies and environmental goods and services, 
trade and climate policy goals pull in the same direction; in others, like subsidies and carbon taxes, they may 
lead to conflict. In both cases, a principled approach to integrating the net-zero target into UK trade policy is 
preferable to an ad hoc or incoherent one. 
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